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I. Introduction

This work will attempt to provide a brief reply and critique of Bruce Ackerman’s
constitutionalism. Bruce Ackerman is the Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science
at Yale University. And he has been for the past quarter of a century actively engaged in
the interpretation of the American Constitution. His efforts have yielded deep insights
into the politics of American Constitutionalism. As is natural with scholars and theorists
that take on large chucks of the Constitution for interpretation, it yields supporters and
critics. Ackerman’s interpretation of American constitutionalism is no exception.
Ackerman’s critics have been particularly vocal and sharp with the publication of his We
the People1 books. As is the case with any such large enterprise, there is much to admire
in Ackerman’s work but also a great deal skepticism with the yield of his efforts.
Ackerman started out his legal career in an effort to grasp the economic impact of
American laws. From a specialized niche in taxation, property law, and
environmentalism, he has branched out into constitutional law issues, jurisprudence, and
general philosophy. Therefore, in Ackerman’s efforts to encompass the whole of
American constitutional development, it has generated a number of critical responses.
Ackerman starts out from the familiar tripartite model of analyzing the major
elements of American constitutionalism. These three pillars of American
constitutionalism are: 1) popular sovereignty, 2) federalism, and 3) individual rights.
This work will focus on the first pillar of American constitutionalism. It will be argued
that Ackerman makes a serious mistake, in his analysis, in grounding his dualist
1

1BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (BELKNAP PRESS OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (BELKNAP PRESS 1998).
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constitutionalism on a foundation of popular sovereignty. Dualism is defined by
Ackerman to mean the process by which lawmaking takes place in the United States. He
characterizes one mode of lawmaking as ordinary and the other as higher lawmaking.
Ordinary lawmaking is the day to day lawmaking that politicians are elected to perform.
Higher lawmaking occurs during exceptional periods of American history where ordinary
citizens are directly thrust into the political arena in deciding the future course of the
political system as a whole. His thesis of dualist constitutionalism centers around “We
the People” delegating authority to the professional politicians to make law during
normal periods, and the idea that citizens are willing to become more active participants
in public affairs during extra-ordinary times. He asserts that We the People must
delegate day-to-day governmental activity to the elected officials, the professional
politicians. But, during periods of turmoil, crises, and other public stresses, the citizens
are called upon to participate in the political process in a more direct way.
This brief reply could not adequately treat each and every major element in
Ackerman’s book, We the People. Hence, the major focus will be to critically analyze
the first element in his thesis. This element centers on his interpretation of what
demarcates “constitutional moments” of change in American politics. A “constitutional
moment” is defined as a major turning point in American politics as evidenced by a
tectonic shift from what came before in the daily lives of people. For example, the
American Revolution was a constitutional moment because it resulted in a tectonic and
structural shift in the politics and identity of the American people. Another example is
the Civil War, prior to the Civil War slavery was legal and tolerated in the United States.
After the Civil War, it became illegal to have slaves. The final example of a major
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constitutional moment in American politics is the New Deal because it shifted away from
giving primacy to local and state rules to a system where the Federal government takes
on greater responsibility for the lives of citizens.
Ackerman believes that the Supreme Court played an important role in codifying
these tectonic shifts in American law. But, is Ackerman correct in his analysis of the
Supreme Court as codifier of the people’s will when the people have spoken on those rare
constitutional moments? Has the Supreme Court adequately listened to the People and
codified what the People said? This work will argue that such a simplistic schema is not
an accurate representation of Supreme Court opinion surrounding each of Ackerman’s
“constitutional moments.” That Popular Sovereignty, as conceived in Ackerman’s We
the People, is a flawed idea, and he makes a mistake to adopt it as a foundational matter
in describing American political development. Popular sovereignty is the idea that what
the people have to say in political affairs matters. An appeal to the People may make for
good advertising copy, but it plays a small role in American constitutional history.
The key question is: Does Ackerman’s dualist democracy, in We the People, serve as
an adequate description of representing the will of the American people? This question
will be broken down into two parts. The first involves historiography, i.e., does his oneConstitution/three-regime theory, as outlined in his “constitutional moments” of political
change, fairly capture the will of the American people? The second part asks: Is
Ackerman correct in casting the Supreme Court as the codifier and preserver of the
People’s will during those “constitutional moments” when they have spoken?
Ackerman relies on the concept of popular sovereignty to vindicate his view of
constitutionalism. However, this foundation is a very shaky foundation, and Ackerman
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does not give it adequate consideration. This reply will show that Supreme Court case
law does not support Ackerman’s democratization thesis.
Ackerman’s We the People project is a projected three-volume effort, with the first
two volumes already published. Although this work will focus on volume one, it will
also borrow heavily from volume two. We the People covers much ground, and an
adequate analysis of all its parts would be difficult to treat within a single paper or book.
But, before proceeding to a more specialized and limited treatment of We the People, an
overall sense of Ackerman’s project will be provided. In his first volume Foundations, he
takes his theory of higher lawmaking and ordinary lawmaking and attempts to explain his
dualist democracy. It serves as the foundation for his constitutional philosophy. He
focuses on political foundations and tectonic shifts in political regimes from one
generation to the next generation. The second volume Transitions takes the three major
regime changes in American history and explains how this tripartite model can be of help
in explaining American political and constitutional development.
Ackerman has set himself the major task of re-conceptualizing American
constitutional law. He is bold in his challenge to both historian and theorist to re-think
American constitutional politics. As indicated above, the cornerstone of his enterprise is
what he describes as the dualist democracy of the American system of government. With
this stroke, he challenges both parliamentarians and individual rights foundationalists to
re-conceptualize American democracy. Parliamentarians are people who give priority to
the legislative branch of government over the executive or judiciary. Individual rights
foundationalists give priority to inherent or granted rights of individuals to shape their
lives free from electoral politics. Voting should not be sufficient grounds to negate
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inalienable rights that were granted by either a higher being or granted over generations
as a matter of common law. Whereas parliamentarians would put everything to a vote,
individual rights people carve out a space from the democratic process that is sacred and
immune to democratic politics. The tension between a carved out sphere of individual
rights free from the democratic process and the ability of democratic institutions to
subject all matters to a vote has been an ongoing debate for generations.
Ackerman attempts to reconcile this tension between rights and democracy by giving
democratic institutions a privileged position in altering rights that may be considered
sacred by some. In this effort, he moves boldly and with sweeping breadth in this reconceptualization project. He intends no less than to overturn more conventional
understandings of American constitutionalism. To do so, he breaks up American history
into three major constitutional moments—the Framing of the Constitution, the Civil War,
and the New Deal. Each of these constitutional moments has come about by
revolutionary2 upheaval and serves as a major marker for beginning any meaningful
analysis of American constitutionalism. These three major constitutional moments have
brought forth vast changes in how Americans define themselves and interpret their
history.
What is defined as the constitutional moment theory of historical change goes beyond
the cut and dry positivist understanding of American constitutional law. Ackerman
means no less than to overturn the conventional understanding of constitutional change in

2

Ackerman uses the term “revolutionary” in a different sense than the French Revolution, Leninist, or
Maoist types of revolution. He believes that there can be such a thing as a liberal revolution. As a liberal,
he generally means upheaval that falls short of total revolution, but, nevertheless, can still be revolutionary
in scope. Ackerman has been influenced by Hannah Arendt’s work on this matter. For an elaboration on
his conception of revolution, see: Bruce Ackerman, Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 YALE L.J. 2279
(1999).
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the United States. Convention has it that the American people, through their
representatives, are sworn to uphold the Constitution as it is written and changed via the
formalist procedure set out in Article Five. That is, Article Five of the Constitution
specifies all the legitimate ways that it could be altered. Ackerman believes this is not an
accurate explanation of the American system of government. In the place of such a
formalist procedure, he attempts to substitute a more dynamic and dialectical explanation
of constitutional change. What lies at the heart of this enterprise is the Constitution is
seen as a “living” document that can be altered by a multitude of ways that go outside of
Article Five procedures and thereby giving new life to the document.3
In the process of explaining his theory of constitutional change, Ackerman
commingles the liberal and republican traditions of political theory. He attempts to
bridge the Hartzian and Pocockian tradition via his dualist democratic theory.4 He cannot
either fully endorse the Liberal/Hartzian tradition of American development with all the
paraphernalia of American exceptionalism, or the Republican/Pocockian tradition with
citizens breaking out of their selfish needs to help the Republic. He aims to bridge this
dual explanation of American development by acknowledging the strong liberal
individualist streak in American politics without ignoring a tradition of civic virtue.

3

Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995) (Tribe argues, in opposition to this
proposition, that Article V is not as malleable as Ackerman would have us believe. That in fact Article V
does have teeth to it and cannot easily be discarded in the name of higher lawmaking.)
4
LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (A HARVEST/HBJ BOOK 1955); J.G.A. POCOCK,
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN
TRADITION (PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 1975). For a critique of both neo-liberal and neo-republican
approaches, see: Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 523, 529 (1995). For a further critique of the Hartzian model of American democracy, see: NORMAN
BIRNBAUM, THE RADICAL RENEWAL: THE POLITICS OF IDEAS IN MODERN AMERICA (PANTHEON BOOKS
1988). Birnbaum says, “Hartz’s view of the United States as a society whose central agreement was that it
was a democracy of property owners, and Hofstadter’s pervasive skepticism about the extent to which
democracy could dominate property (to which was added an even more pronounced skepticism about the
bona fides and efficacy of many of the tribunes of democracy).” p. 60.
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Ackerman shifts back and forth between liberalism and republicanism as he weaves his
tale of American development. As Miriam and William Galston wrote, “On another
level, We the People represents Ackerman’s effort to mediate between liberal democratic
theorists and their civic republican critics.”5
Further, Ackerman neither endorses a Wilsonian/Beardian progressive explanation of
American constitutional development6, nor a more liberal laissez-faire explanation.7
Again, he is relying on his dualist democracy to bridge the gap between class/interest
politics and unfettered privatization of national and natural resources.8 Yet, Ackerman is
convinced that there is a discernable pattern to American development. His
constitutional moments theory encompasses an explanation for how political change is
legitimated in the United States, and how the masses play a vital role in that legitimation
process.
Ackerman does this by splitting up politics into “normal” and “higher” level. By
normal politics, he means the day-to-day legislation that governmental representatives are
engaged in debating, blocking, or passing, about which the typical citizen knows nothing
of what or whom such legislation will benefit or hurt. Presumably the representatives are
acting for the benefit of all citizens. Whereas Ackerman characterizes higher level
politics as those rare moments, three such moments thus far, according to Ackerman that
brings the people into the political arena. Therefore, when the people speak on those rare

5

Miriam Galston & William A. Galston, Reason, Consent, and the U.S. Constitution: Bruce Ackerman’s
We the People, 104 ETHICS 447 (1994).
6
WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (MERIDIAN BOOKS, INC. 1956); CHARLES A.
BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (THE FREE PRESS,
1986).
7
WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, WHAT SOCIAL CLASSES OWE TO EACH OTHER (HARPER & BROTHERS
PUBLISHING, 1920).
8
William W. Fisher III, The Defects of Dualism, 59 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 955, 964-974
(1992).
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occasions, what they say should be taken seriously by the professional politicians and the
courts.
One key aspect of this “higher” level of politics is that citizens are brought directly
into the political arena. According to Ackerman, the citizens play a key role in the
“debating” and “deliberation” phase of the constitutional moment. Ackerman marks out
four distinct stages in his constitutional moments theory of change: 1) political signaling,
2) proposing, 3) public debate/deliberation, and 4) Supreme Court codification.9 All of
these stages of major political transformation have been questioned by scholars, but stage
three has received sustained critique. For example, Nedelsky says:
What makes for a successful moment of constitutional politics? By Ackerman’s own arguments, it
cannot be simply persuading enough people to accept the change you advocate; it requires getting
them to ponder and deliberate the change with serious and sustained attention. Ackerman tells us
too little about what enables a people to do this, especially given the rather grim picture he paints of
what people do during the long periods of normal politics. What will enable them to reflect
thoughtfully and effectively about basic shared political values, when for decades they have done
little more than try to pursue their private interests?10

Also, Ackerman casts the Supreme Court in a “preservationist” role. That is, the Court
serves to codify what the people said, and monitors the politicians during normal political
periods to insure they do not exceed the people’s will. Hence, the Supreme Court, in the
Ackermanian worldview plays a vital role in preserving the will of the people, until the
people speak again. Ackerman sees the federalist role and separation of powers as vital
in describing the American system of government. He will counterpoise this federalist
position to the parliamentarian or Wilsonian understanding—or as he calls the Wilsonian
democrats: “monistic” democrats. The Wilsonian democrats give the legislature
supremacy. That is, a Wilsonian is like a parliamentarian, a person that sees the benefits
9

WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, pp. 267-269; for a more detailed presentation of Ackerman’s four stage
theory of constitutional change, see generally, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS.
10
Jennifer Nedelsky, The Puzzle and Demands of Modern Constitutionalism, 104 ETHICS 513 (1994).
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of giving primary authority to the legislative branch of government over the executive or
the judiciary.
The final major element in the Ackerman thesis involves his treatment of individual
rights. Here, Ackerman departs from his liberal position into a more civic understanding
of individual rights. He will not ground his thesis in a natural rights philosophy. That is,
he will not ground individual rights in a “higher power” or “being.”11 Nor will he fix
rights as immutable once placed in the Constitution. Hence, he objects to there being
natural rights that could not be overturned by popular will if the people so chose to do so.
He refers to those that protect rights first and democracy second as Rights
Foundationalists.12
According to Leuchtenberg, scholars have not been kind to Ackerman’s
constitutional moments theory.
Scholars have dealt harshly with Bruce Ackerman’s audacious reconfiguration of American
constitutional history. Suzanna Sherry, who calls the Yale Law School professor “one of our best
constitutionalist theorists,” nevertheless concludes that “Ackerman’s tale fails to inspire, because it
is mired in a fictional past and envisions a utopian future” and because his “historical analysis is
simplistic.”13

Now that the broad summary of Ackerman’s work in We the People has been stated,
it will be examined in a more detailed way and sharpen the focus of what this paper aims
to do and hopes to accomplish.
II. Constitutional Moments Historiography and Democracy’s Prospects
11

Flaherty says, “For starters, Ackerman skimps on what Edward C. Corwin termed “the ‘[h]igher [l]aw’
[b]ackground of American Constitutional law.” As a matter of theory, We the People has little patience for
“natural law”—or “right reason”—as a source of constitutional rights or value. [A]ny strategy for
protecting rights outside constitutional politics can only be an ahistorical and essentially un-American
import. But virtues higher lawmaking may not be all the Federalists believe in. As Bailyn pointed out a
generation ago, American Whigs marched toward resolution with “the law of nature” as one of several
arrows in their quiver.” (p. 588).
12
WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, pp. 10-16.
13
William E. Leuchtenburg, When the People Spoke, What Did They Say?: The Election of 1936 and the
Ackerman Thesis, 108 YALE L. J. 2077 (1999).
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Ackerman states that there were three constitutional moments in American history.
The first was the American Revolution/Constitution; the second was the Civil
War/Reconstruction, and the third was the Great Depression/New Deal. According to
Ackerman, these three major markers are the bedrock of American constitutional law as
we know it today. Should any or all of these upheavals not have occurred, we would
have a vastly different constitutional system.
Ackerman’s historiography in depicting these demarcations is problematic. Many
historians are left uncomfortable with Ackerman’s leap into their domain. Ackerman
claims that his historiography is anti-Burkean, yet one legal historian depicts his
approach to be exactly that, Burkean.14 A Burkean is someone who believes in
incremental change, is suspicious of abstract principles, and sees rule by the People as a
troublesome concept. This I will call Ackerman’s “historiographic problem.”
The second component of the problem deals with the claim that the Supreme Court
has served as codifier of what the People have said during constitutional moments. This
work will show that Ackerman’s depiction of the Supreme Court as preserving the
People’s will is seriously flawed and an inaccurate reflection of American
constitutionalism. This I will call Ackerman’s “the Supreme Court as preserver problem.”
As indicated earlier, Ackerman’s constitutional moments theory involves four stages:
1) political signaling, 2) proposal, 3) public debate/deliberation, and 4) Supreme Court
codification. Political signaling indicates the need for political change. The proposal
stage is one whereby elected leaders spell out their plans to address the new political

14

Eben Moglen, The Incomplete Burkean: Bruce Ackerman’s Foundation for Constitutional History, 5
YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 531 (1993).
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problem. The public debate and deliberation stage is the most critical because it demands
that the public at large have an input in legitimizing the plans to resolve the changed
circumstances of the nation. The final stage is basically a consolidation stage. It calls
upon the Supreme Court to preserve the changes proposed and effectuated in the first
three stages. The Court is asked to play this role because normal politics may dissipate
the revolutionary gains made during the third stage. In order to secure the People’s
judgment and will from being whittled away during normal politics, the Court is asked to
insure that the politicians do not backslide to a pre-revolution stage once the
revolutionary fervor ends. According to this theory, the Founding, Reconstruction, and
New Deal meet all of these criteria. Ackerman argues that these moments in American
history are moments of regime change. Hence, once the above listed criteria have been
met, it indicates that “We the People” have spoken.
For Ackerman constitutional moments are periods of “constitutional politics” or
higher level politics, during which ordinary citizens participate in the political arena.
They have transformed themselves from private observers and selfish individuals to
civic-minded, public-regarding citizens. “Ackerman regards the concept of ‘private
citizenship’ as being the foundational idea underlying dualism. As the founders
recognized, most citizens in the United States are private citizens, not public citizens or
perfect privatists.”15
With this level of involvement of the mass of citizenry, during constitutional
moments, politicians and the judiciary cannot disregard or take lightly what “We the
People” have said. And for Ackerman, these constitutional moments are very rare in
15

Kent Greenwalt, Dualism and Its Status, 104 ETHICS 480 (1994); see also, Bruce A. Ackerman, NeoFederalism? in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY, Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds. (CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1988). pp. 175-176.
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American history. Ackerman finds only three such major constitution/regime changing
events, in the 200-plus year history of the United States. During a return to normal
politics, the professional politicians and judges must update their policies to reflect those
changes that the People demanded.
Many commentators and critics have dissected Ackerman’s work from numerous
angles and perspectives. This reply attempts to make a contribution to the ongoing
political and constitutional debate by approaching Ackerman’s analysis of American
constitutional politics from a rather unique angle. Ackerman, along with most of his
critics, approach American political and constitutional development with a presupposition
that takes democracy for granted. That is, democracy is assumed to be feasible even
before any constitutional moments play themselves out. Democracy is like air, we notice
it when we are chocking for lack thereof. Or democracy is like water. It is all over the
place and noticed when it’s gone, during moments of drought. So it is taken for granted
by both political scientists and constitutional law scholars, and democracy is taken as
foundational for scholars beginning their inquiry into American politics.
This work will distinguish itself from the constitutional literature in that it will not
presuppose such a democratic foundation. What Ackerman and his critics take for
granted in their analysis of American politics and constitutionalism will be questioned
here. That is, this work will not presuppose any possibility of the realization of
democratic theory in the real world of American politics or in any other country’s politics
for that matter.
The realization of democratic principles in real life, outside of the theoretical world, is
hard to come by if not non-existent. The usual defense of nations falling short of
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democratic principles, including the United States, has been that we have a democracy in
its rudimentary form, in its primitive form, in an undeveloped state, but we are growing
our democracy day and night. That is, although democracy does not exist anywhere in
the world in a perfect state, nevertheless, it is being home grown in many countries
throughout the world, and each country has reached its own level of democratic growth.
So the upshot of this is that some variation of democracy is worth striving for, even if
perfect democracy cannot be established in the real world. What Ackerman and his
critics fail to notice is that democracy is a fictionalism, perhaps a useful fiction is some
abstract sense, but nevertheless a fiction. This reply dispenses of any such hope, dream,
or expectation of democracy’s growth. The foundation of this work, unlike Ackerman
and his critics, does not presuppose the possibility of a democratic foundation, and the
concept democracy is taken to be a basically metaphysical concept.16
Historically, the notions of democracy and popular sovereignty have not fared very
well. Even Lincoln’s “great antagonist” could have endorsed a notion of popular
sovereignty akin to Ackerman’s idea.
Ackerman’s near-neglect of this possibility reflects the remarkable resemblance between his
position and that of Lincoln’s great antagonist, Stephen Douglas. It was Douglas, after all, who
affirmed the principle of “Popular Sovereignty”: As long as the inhabitants of the territories
conformed to the relevant procedural norms, they were perfectly free to decide whether to enter the
16

For convenience’s sake, not every use of the word “democracy” will be placed in quotations. Here the
concept is being used either to conform to common rhetoric of its existence or to describe Ackerman or his
critics. Although his critics are evaluating Ackerman’s work, they are, nevertheless, working within the
same framework or paradigm as he is. Hence, it should in no way be inferred that this paper will either
accept or rely on any democratic principles that inform the work of other scholars or theorists. For a
detailed critique of democracy, see: EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (THE UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KENTUCKY 1973). Purcell
says, “In Public Opinion Lippmann had retained some hope for a chastened, elite-controlled democracy,
but he abandoned even that during the next three years. The Phantom Public, which he published in 1925,
revealed an almost complete despair about the possibility of democratic government. His last hope was
that people could be taught simply not to meddle in public affairs. If that were possible, private interests
could somehow make the governmental process work. The public did not and could not govern.” (p. 106).
Further, Purcell goes on to say, “By the end of the twenties many students of government had come to
reject what they considered the romantic idea that all men should actively engage in governing the country,
assuming the irrationality of most men and the practical impossibility of actual popular control.” (p. 108).

14

union as free or slave states, and there were no deeper constitutional principles inclined one way or
the other. And while the event is unlikely in the extreme, Ackerman’s dualist democracy similarly
offers no principled arguments against a suitably mobilized majority of the people that chose to
institute slavery.
It is pertinent to recall the grounds on which Lincoln opposed Popular Sovereignty, so
understood. His thesis was that the collective right of the people to rule themselves, the right to
begin the Constitution with “We the People,” rests on a foundation of equal rights for individuals.17

Beyond the Lincoln-Douglas debates, the concept of popular sovereignty has not fared
well.18 Whether the concept of popular sovereignty is equivalent to the concept of
democracy is hard to say. But, regardless, of the degree of equivalence, they have not
fared well as explanatory tools of American constitutional politics. In particular, the
notion of democracy has not done well either in its 2000-plus years of historical journey
from Greece; nor has it fared well in its modern reincarnation, since the French
Revolution. Outside of rhetoric or high theory, one would be hard pressed during
democracy’s 200-year revival to find nations, countries, and states that have lived up
either to its rhetoric or high-theory expectations. Consequently, those scholars or
theorists that accept and incorporate such a theory in their investigations, analyses, or
reviews have a very heavy burden to carry in explaining why they are incorporating such
a theory into their work.
Accordingly, this work will argue that Ackerman’s dualist democratic principles are
problematic, because he implicitly and explicitly adopts a democratic foundation for his

17

Galston & Galston, p. 457.
“The sovereignty of the people is a key element of American constitutionalism. [T]he ratification of the
Constitution through constitutional conventions enabled the founding generation to implement the abstract
idea that only the people could adopt a fundamental law. Yet the doctrine of popular sovereignty has never
had an entirely clear meaning in the American constitutional tradition. [M]ost colonists accepted the idea,
conventional in the political theory of the time, that there must be a supreme, indivisible, final, and absolute
power in every government. [I]n the debate over ratification of the Constitution, the Federalists gave new
emphasis to the idea of popular sovereignty. Neither state government nor the new federal government was
to be sovereign. Instead, the American people as a whole were the true sovereign, parceling out authority to
the different levels and branches of government.” STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM:
FROM THEORY TO POLITICS (PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 1996). pp 19-20.
18
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constitutional analysis. Ackerman knows very well from his reading of the Constitution
and of the disposition of the Framers of this document that they neither endorsed
democracy nor incorporated democratic principles into the Constitution. Hence,
Ackerman has a very heavy burden of proof to bear in finding the rudimentary elements
of democratic principles underpinning the Constitution or in explaining how those who
drafted the Constitution, being non-democrats to the last man, could have somehow
inculcated any democratic principles into the document that they were drafting.
Ackerman has no difficulty accepting, and gladly accepting, such a challenge because a
close analysis of his book, We the People, indicates that he is well aware that the original
Constitution and its Founders were not democrats. But, this will not deter Ackerman in
establishing the democratic bona fides of the Constitution retroactively. That is, although
the Constitution did not start its life as a democratic document, it was subsequently
transformed into a democratic document via the blood that was spilled to make certain
fundamental amendments stick to it. Hence, the whole Constitution has experienced a
rebirth every time the People stood up and demanded changes.
There are formidable problems of determining that “we the people” were the authors of any major
political change in the United States—from the elite gathering of the constitutional convention in
1787 to the embrace of the regulatory state by much of the corporate elite in the New Deal era. I
have come close to arguing that the Constitution of 1787 was designed to make it practically
impossible for “we the people” ever to form and give effect to their considered political judgment.19

Built into Ackerman’s conception of American development is American
exceptionalism, with a wink and nod to Hartz and to the Whig tradition of casting
American democracy as a march for progress, liberty, and apple pie. That is, Ackerman

19

Nedelsky, p. 503.
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sees American democracy as one of the strongest and one of the healthiest democracies
ever known on this planet.
Ackerman is fully aware of historical arguments that suggest the difficulties in the
formation and maintenance of democracies. He addresses some of the historical or
theoretical concerns of democracy by distinguishing his dualist democracy from its
Wilsonian and direct democracy cousins. But if democracy is not a viable or possible
model, then whether it is dualist, unitarian, direct, or what have you, it is simply a very
serious error to build such a model in describing the American system of government. It
not only does not accurately reflect the current American situation, but it also risks
distorting American historical development. This work will have none of such
presuppositions.
Ackerman is jubilant and at times celebratory of the progression of American
democracy. He sprinkles his rhetoric, in We the People, with nothing less than God
smiling down on American democracy, with the Deity justly rewarding the American
people with its blessings. So Ackerman’s jubilation and overflow of patriotic fervor
underlies much ground that he covers, only to pile qualification upon qualification, as the
good lawyer that he is, to make sure that his enthusiasm and jubilation do not overtake
his cautious lawyerly approach to writing constitutional history.
Ackerman aims at no less than rehabilitating the “People” in casting them front and
center of American political development. For Ackerman, the People are the source and
foundation and necessary energy to legitimize constitutional regimes and regime change
during those critical moments that serve as markers to subsequent changes in
constitutional law. “Still there are very grave problems with trying to legitimate the U.S.
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government via popular consent. For at least two-thirds of American history, the
majority of the adult population was legally ineligible to vote.”20 “Whereas Bickel
rejects “the People” and popular sovereignty as abstractions, Ackerman wants to imbue
those concepts with meaning.”21 Without the People serving this important role,
Ackerman would become very dismayed at the prospects of developing and nurturing
American democracy.
Unfortunately, Ackerman’s belief in the People appears to be a very vague, almost a
mystical belief—that they can be counted on to help bolster and define American
prospects. Not only does Ackerman use the notion of the People as a trump card, but, he
makes it easy for the People to exist in Ackerman’s dualist democracy. The main
function of the People in Ackerman’s democracy is played out during stage three of his
constitutional moments theory of regime change, the stage that involves public debate
and deliberation on the part of the People to bring forth and help in the legitimation of the
new regime. After the People have spoken, they can go back to sleep, so to speak, for the
next 60 or so years—until they are required to awaken from their slumber for the next
regime change.
Ackerman has a very good reason to assign the People this vital role. He recognizes,
as well as many other empirical social scientists, that the People have fallen asleep during
periods of normal politics. So if Ackerman is to salvage the role of the People in a
democracy, he needs to make sure they are definite participants in the system, but on only
very few occasions. The rest of the time, if the people manage to get themselves to the
20

Roger M. Smith, Legitimating Reconstruction: The Limits of Legalism, 108 YALE L. J. 2039, 2055
(1999).
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Laura Kalman, Law, Politics, and the New Deal(s), 108 YALE L. J. 2165, 2208 (1999); see generally,
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2nd ed., (YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS 1986).
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polls and pull the lever once a year or perhaps every couple of years, the People have
fulfilled their citizen role.
Ackerman sees no other way to inject ordinary citizens into the “normal” political
debate on a continuous basis. As a follower of The Federalist and practical and shrewd
reader of poll returns, he realizes his dualist democracy needs to make the People vital,
yet also needs to explain their lack of participation and interest in day-to-day politics.

III. A Critical Analysis of the Underpinning of Ackerman’s Constitutional
Democracy

The gist of this brief reply to Ackerman should suggest that Ackerman’s appeals to the
People is nothing more than a smoke screen used to obscure the true objectives
underlying various ideologies, ideas, and dreams that require wide support.22 Political
scientists have not been kind to the idea of the People, especially since World War II, as
the various behavioral models suggest that there are many people out there, but not a
single entity encompassing the People as a whole.
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Another scholar that is troubled by Ackerman’s appropriation of the phrase “We the People” is Randy
Barnett. Barnett is skeptical of the unity such a phrase implies in the granting of consent or legitimacy to
the proposed courses of action by the professional politicians, in the name “We the People.” Barnett says:
“[I] will show that “We the People” is a fiction. I will demonstrate that constitutional legitimacy has not
been conferred by either the individual or collective consent of We the People. [T]hough genuine consent,
were it to exist, could give rise to a duty of obedience, the conditions necessary for We the People actually
to consent to anything like the Constitution or amendments thereto have never existed and could never
exist.” Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, (Working
Paper Series, Public Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 01-19). p. 8.
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Pluralist political scientists, such as Robert Dahl, were able to capitalize on this insight
in the 1950s by breaking up democracy into various interests groups.23 Interest groups
competing for resources, collectively take on the role of the People. Hence, democracy
was redefined from the People speaking to the various interests groups speaking in their
competition with one another for scarce resources through votes and dollars. This is a
more utilitarian and practical form of democracy than the lofty “We the People”
version.24
Nevertheless, this does not deter Ackerman from serving as a cheerleader for
American exceptionalism and his faith in “We the People.” Even though Ackerman
splits citizens into three groupings—public citizen, private citizen, and perfect privatist—
it is not clear what he is trying to accomplish with such a division.25 Presumably, during
constitutional moments, most citizens regardless of their classification during normal
politics will become engaged and participate.
Ackerman appears to have an overly psychological explanation for participation in
politics. It basically centers on the self-interest or selfish nature of our species. Whereas
the People go about their day-to-day business during the normal political season, they
23

ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS 1989); DILEMMAS OF
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JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (HARPER TORCHBOOKS 1976).
Schumpeter’s procedural version of democracy marked a whole generation of post-World War II political
scientists that became disillusioned over the prospects of an earlier more substantive and more progressive
version of democracy. Ido Oren, How America’s Foreign Policy Affects Its Political Science, THE
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, sect. II, September 6, 2002, p. Oren says, “Progressive definitions
of ‘democracy’ that had been common in the 1930s met a similar fate. During the Great Depression
political scientists often defined democracy as much in economic as in political terms and as much in terms
of substantive ideals as in terms of electoral process. [R]obert A. Dahl of Yale mounted a lucid defense of
democratic socialism in his doctoral dissertation in 1940. Merriam defined democracy partly in terms of
ideals such as ‘the perfectibility of mankind’ and fair distribution of economic gains throughout society.
But, in the 1950s, political scientists concluded that faith in human ‘perfectibility’ was a pathology
associated with ‘totalitarian’ regimes, and they abandoned substantive visions of democracy in favor of
procedural definitions inspired by the work of Joseph A. Schumpeter.” (p. B13).
25
WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, pp. 230-235.
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seem to be forced into the political arena with focused attention to the goings on of public
life during disasters, upheavals, famines, etc. So, Ackerman basically has a captive
audience, whether they like it or not, during turbulent times. Whether this shock therapy
or forced labor in the public domain properly squares with the People’s choices is another
matter. But Ackerman is able to claim, with some plausibility, that crises generate
intense public interest in the issues and policies of the day.
However, if democracy is defined by voluntary participation in the political arena,
then Ackerman’s schematic is problematic because he catches his audience in a forced
way during periods of upheaval. Regardless of whether the masses become mobilized
under such immediate threat to their personal, economic, or land interests, it would seem
to suggest that such moments are the worst period to consult the People, because they are
less lucid and in a panic and are more likely to operate as a mob rather than calm citizens
weighing their political options.26 That is, Ackerman defines his constitutional moments
as critical to his definition of a dualist democracy, but it seems that turbulent periods
would be the worst time to consult the people, since the People are reacting under
emergency conditions and are liable to over-react and take matters into their own hands.
And if history is any guide, the People will mobilize themselves into deadly mobs and
will threaten life or property of those they perceive as their enemy.
Yet Ackerman singles out such a period in his constitutional moments schematic to
invite the People into the public debate. This seems to me to be a shortsighted and
erroneous analysis of crises situations. Yet, Ackerman would have us believe that the

26

Terrence Sandalow, Abstract Democracy: A Review of Ackerman’s WE THE PEOPLE, 9 CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMENTARY 309 (1992). “Crises do sometimes bring out the best in us, but at times they seem to do the
opposite. It is, therefore, hardly self-evident that the increased popular attention to politics during such
periods is especially likely to produce public-spirited deliberation.” (p. 327)
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People are in their most creative mode during such periods. One would assume that such
periods should be treated as aberrations, and more thoughtful and creative solutions come
about during less stressful and peaceful times. But, Ackerman would have none of it.
At bottom, although Ackerman would not directly admit it, he supports judicial
supremacy in the day-to-day monitoring of normal politics. The Supreme Court’s
preservationist role becomes critical to ensuring that the professional politicians do not
exceed the parameters set out by the People. Hence, indirectly, Ackerman has set up the
Supreme Court as the ultimate authority and interpreter of the People’s will during
normal periods. Unlike the Progressive monists, such as Wilson, that give priority and
supremacy to the legislative branch, Ackerman opts out for a federalist system where the
Supreme Court serves as the ultimate interpreter and codifier of the People’s will.
To what degree this undermines his faith in democratic principles is unclear.
Although the People may speak in amorphous terms, it is the responsibility of the
Supreme Court to decipher what they said and to codify it. It is a rather dubious
proposition that the Court can maintain such a role. A brief review of Supreme Court
opinions will show that the Court has not carried out its preservationist role, as Ackerman
would have us believe.
The history of the Supreme Court is mostly one of neglect with regard to what the
People have to say. But it is puzzling why a well-educated man such as Ackerman would
place such ultimate faith in the Supreme Court. He is fully aware that the Supreme Court
has been ahead of the People in a few cases in American history—and dragged its feet on
popular demands in other cases. Yet, the Court could hardly be characterized as the
People’s preservation institute. Of course, here Ackerman neglects the fact that most
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judgeships below the Supreme Court level are elected judgeships in the United States,
with all that elections entail in terms of fundraising, politicking, campaigning, promising,
and executing the partisan will of their supporters.27 Nevertheless, Ackerman feels
comfortable in casting the Supreme Court as the ultimate guardian of the People’s will.28
As indicated earlier, Ackerman characterizes American constitutional history as one
Constitution/three regimes. He marks the first regime from the endorsement of the
original Constitution until the Civil War, the second regime (also referred to as the
Middle Republic) from the Civil War to the New Deal, and the third regime from the
New Deal to the present. Ackerman takes the Civil War Amendments and the New Deal
actions as markers for the emplacement of the new regimes. But unlike Justice Black,
who saw the Civil War Amendments as incorporating the original Bill of Rights,29 sort of
nationalizing the Bill of Rights, Ackerman is convinced that the Civil War Amendments
and the New Deal changes amounted to giving birth to new regimes, vastly different from
the previous ones, yet not wholly discarding what came earlier.
Yet, those doctrinalists that uphold the restoration thesis take issue with Ackerman
over the New Deal as a new regime. Rather they view the situation as one of restoration,
believing that the Court of the Middle Republic, as evidenced by the Lochnerism of the
period, exceeded its authority in overstepping the boundaries of the other branches of
government and meddling with political and economic questions and issues.30
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Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L.
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WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS, chap. 9.
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According to the “restoration thesis,” the election of 1936, instead of bringing forth a
new constitutional regime, was simply putting the Court back in its proper place. That is,
the Court was to leave the political questions to the other branches of government and
simply stick to interpreting the law. And the election of 1936 forced the justices to
restore its traditional role by overturning their Lochnerian philosophy of reading a
particular economics into their decisions. That is, the restoration theorists believe the
Court has restoring it proper role in the federalist system by leaving economic and
political questions to the other bodies. Hence, it was believed that the Court exceed its
authority during the previous 50 years, and the election returns of 1936 strongly indicated
that the Court best retreat and to leave economic decisions to the political bodies and not
go beyond those economic/property protections clearly stated in the text of the
Constitution. “This is nowhere better illustrated than by the reaction of some leading
Harvard doctrinalists to Ackerman’s criticism of restorationism. The response of Charles
Fried and Laurence Tribe contain more than a whiff of the idea that the post-1937 Court
was returning to the path laid down by Chief Justice Marshall.”31
Ackerman, however, will not have any of this restoration thesis.32 He attempts in his
work to refute any suggestion that the Court has simply backtracking to a previous
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Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 YALE L. J. 2115, 2123 (1999).
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position. His dialectical historiography suggests rather than retreating, the Court has
been forced to move forward. That is, most doctrinalists take the Middle Republic
opinions to be an aberration. But, Ackerman suggests nothing of the kind. Rather, he
maintains that those opinions were proper, and the Court was simply reflecting the statecentered,33 Social Darwinian thrust of the time of the Middle Republic. There was
nothing aberrational about it. So according to Ackerman, the Court was forced to make
progress after 1936 rather than retreat to an earlier period.
Similarly, Ackerman does not accept any explanation that smacks of the “grasp of
war”34 theory in explaining the inclusion of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. He
does not believe that the Republicans had a mandate, or a right, to exclude the Southern
Democrats in passing the 14th Amendment, under a “grasp of war” theory, because
Lincoln maintained all along that the South never had left the Union. Hence, claims
Ackerman, the Southern states were illegitimately excluded from voting on the 14th
Amendment, because under Lincoln's theory the South never left the Union, and they
could return to their proper place within the Union upon the termination of hostilities.
So, Ackerman does not buy the explanation that the Republicans were properly excluding
rebel states because they were defeated and terms were dictated to them before they could
mistaken interpretations were corrected or that the balance of power between legislative and judicial
branches was righted.” (p. 119).
33
State-centered government being one in which the Federal government did not have the level of control
over the local economy during the Middle Republic period. The Federal government played a smaller role
vis-à-vis the state governments. It was a period where states held more power in controlling their economy
than after the federalizing of the economy post-New Deal.
34
The “gasp of war” theory suggests that Lincoln was wrong in suggesting that the Southern states
formally left the Union. Although they seceded it was not a lawful exit, as rebellion states, once they laid
down their arms, they were back to their original and lawful place in the Union. So they had a
constitutional right to vote on the Reconstruction amendments because they ceased their hostilities.
Historians have found such an explanation hard to believe. The “gasp of war” thesis holds that once the
Southern states left the Union and took up arms against the Union, they became enemy combatants, not
simply a minor breach but a break in the Union. So upon their surrender, they were in no position to dictate
terms. In this “gasp of war” scenario, Lincoln was wrong. These states had to follow the orders of the
Union if they expected to be taken back into the Union as full participants.
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be allowed to rejoin the Union. Since the South made it clear that they would not vote
for the 14th Amendment, they could properly be excluded as long as they failed to meet
the terms and conditions set for defeated combatants.35
What appears to be emerging is not simply a semantics debate as to the proper reading
of historical documents, but the various interpretations based on ideological debates.
With each group attempting to find a particular reading of historical events that supports
their theory of constitutional evolution in the United States. Some have argued that
Ackerman’s one Constitution/three regime theory of American government is either
under-inclusive or over-inclusive.36 Some of Ackerman’s critics would include the Age
of Jackson, the dismantling of Reconstruction period from the 1870s to 1900s, the Civil
Rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s, and the Feminist Movement of the 1970s.37
At this point, we can begin to see the costly ways in which Ackerman’s framework for legitimating
the American regime minimizes moral substance. According to his telescoped but accurate
retelling, the Jacksonian era was a thirty-year period when the nation through popular elections
frequently endorsed, and the courts consolidated, a vision of the United States as a state-centered,
racist white “democracy” in ways that went far beyond the settled constitutional understandings of
the Founding era.38

Further, Ackerman claims that lawyers, judges, and scholars that see a smooth
transition from the Civil War and the New Deal are making a serious mistake in their
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analysis of American constitutional history. “Throughout, Ackerman stresses the
radicalism, the ‘unconventionality’ of Republican Reconstruction. It is central to his
thesis that Reconstruction worked a ‘transformative’ change—another term that appears
consistently in his text.39 For Ackerman, the essence of transformation was what he calls
a ‘re- founding’ of the United States—the replacement of the incompletely nationalized
polity established in 1788 with a fully nationalized polity.”40 He neither accepts the
grasp of war explanation with regard to the passing of the Reconstruction Amendments
nor the restoration thesis in explaining the Court’s overstepping into the domains of the
other branches of government. And, the election of 1936 forced the Court to return to the
Marshall principle of not entangling the Court in political questions.
So the transformation of the American republic was nationalized and democratized via
the passage of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution and the election of 1936. The
procedures used were outside the formalities of the Constitution itself. Nevertheless, the
document needed updating and change had to be made by going outside the
Constitution’s parameters in order to effect change to the Constitution’s internal organs.

IV. The Supreme Court in the Middle Republic and its Aftermath

The Supreme Court has not served the role well, as the People’s preservation institute
during the Middle Republic. Contrary to Ackerman’s thesis, the Court did not incorporate
the People’s will in the aftermath of the Civil War or New Deal. The Civil War and New

39

See generally, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS.
Michael Les Benedict, Constitutional History and Constitutional Theory: Reflections on Ackerman,
Reconstruction, and the Transformation of the American Constitution, 108 YALE L. J. 2011, 2028-2029
(1999).
40

27

Deal were major events, but the Supreme Court failed to serve as the People’s codifier.
Prior to the Civil War, the Supreme Court supported the institution of slavery with its
opinion in Dred Scott v. Sanford,41 which was overturned by the 13th Amendment, but
the Supreme Court did not take the 14th Amendment as a fundamental break in American
constitutional law. Cases such as the Civil Rights Cases42 and Plessy v. Ferguson43
continued the segregation and exclusion of blacks even though they gained their
freedom.44
Although big changes were underway during the late 19th century with regard to the
power of private property via the explosion of corporate America, the Supreme Court was
not more inclined to break with the past as Ackerman would have us believe. The
Lochnerian45 bent and Social Darwinian thrust of the turn of the century jurisprudence
does not sit well with democratic principles. But, regardless, of the type of economic
philosophy a particular Court may be imbued, the granting of popular consent becomes
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Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (The Court upheld the freedom of contract doctrine, that the
State had no business interfering in privately agreed to contracts.)
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an illusive enterprise. Barnett put it bluntly, “[t]he conditions necessary for We the
People actually to consent to anything like the Constitution or amendments thereto have
never existed and could never exist.”46
Ackerman’s thesis becomes even weaker with regard to his claim of the effects of
post-New Deal constitutionalism, since no new constitutional amendments were
formalized as a consequence of the Great Depression, as was the case with the Civil War.
Clearly, the Supreme Court thwarted some business regulation demanded by Roosevelt.
Ackerman claims that the People have spoken, and the Roosevelt Administration
responded to the People’s pleas for help by forcing the Court to change direction.
Although there appears to be some truth to this proposition, the reality of the situation
may not be a matter of simple causality.
The Court early in the New Deal was favorably inclined towards Roosevelt’s policies
in such cases as Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell47 and Nebbia v. New
York48show. But, the Court shifted away from the proposed legislation of businesses in
the case of United States v. Butler,49 as a marker thwarting New Deal legislation. And,
the Court was finally pushed to be more accommodating to the New Deal initiatives to
get a hold of the economy as indicated by cases such as West Coast Company v.
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Parrish,50 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,51 United
States v. Darby Lumber Company,52 Wickard v. Filburn,53 and Ferguson v. Skrupa,54 as
the aftermath of the New Deal shakeup and the so-called switch-in-time that saved nine.55
But, it is not clear that Ackerman is correct in characterizing this shakeup as giving
birth to a new regime—as a major break in American constitutional law outside of greater
control and interest in business legislation. It is also not clear whether this was so radical
of a break as to consider it a new regime. The Supreme Court continued to adhere to the
separation of powers. And, although the office of the presidency, under the leadership of
President Roosevelt, has gained in stature, the presidency continued to be boxed in by
cases such as Youngstown Sheet & Tube Corp v. Sawyer56 and United States v. Nixon.57
So, it is clear the Supreme Court toned down its opposition to the legislative control of
business due to the disaster of the Great Depression. As indicated above, the president
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could not take over a business in time of need or emergency, and claims to presidential
privilege fell on deaf ears.
Hence, although the office of the 20th century presidency gained greater stature than
the 19th century office of the presidency due to the leadership efforts of Roosevelt, it
should not be characterized as a major break or a structural change in constitutional
history. Lincoln held considerable power during the Civil War. And, emergency
situations do thrust executives into the limelight. But, this is merely due to the nature of
the office, rather than some planned manifest destiny towards greater democratization.
With the fractional and in fighting of Congress, Presidents are given greater leeway to
show leadership under crises conditions. Congress is not designed to act in such
emergencies because decision by committee is a long drawn out process. In many other
areas of law, it was business as usual. Or, the natural changes that come from the
retirement or exit of Justices. Hence, it seems that Ackerman overplayed his hand in his
characterization of American constitutional history as one-Constitution/three-regimes.

As Ackerman explains the New Deal, the reader too often sees the author’s hand manipulating the
story. Historical actors become oddly prescient. The justices of the Hughes Court, for example, are
portrayed as if they were conscious Ackermanian theorists, merely seeking to prod Franklin
Roosevelt to clarify his electoral mandate with the votes of the New Deal legislation. The book is
also filled with “alternative histories” that imagine the causes of constitutional history if critical
events had gone differently.58
The New Deal model of constitutional change effectively undermines a central element of
constitutionalism, its commitment to formality. Constitutionalism requires adhering to legal forms
rather than directly pursuing a given goal, whether those forms require respecting the boundaries of
the separation of powers, the technicalities of a fair trial, or the categories of the rule of law. By
contrast, Ackerman is most impressed with FDR’s pragmatism, his willingness to make use of any
means to accomplish his goals.59
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As indicated above, the Supreme Court opinions after the Civil War and New Deal do
not support Ackerman’s foundational break with the past to sufficiently sustain his thesis
of one-Constitution/three-regimes. If Ackerman’s thesis is correct, then the Supreme
Court should take decisive steps in the aftermath of the Civil War Amendments and the
New Deal to adapt the Constitution to the new needs of the people. “How, then, should
we assess Ackerman’s contention that 1936 was a constitutional moment? Without
doubt, he goes much too far in maintaining that the American people were consciously
amending the Constitution in 1936.”60
Clearly, legal opinions cannot continue to keep their value once a new political
regime replaces the old regime. But change in law does not come as quickly as it does in
politics. Hence, many intervening factors, along with the natural replacement of Court
justices, can lead to change in Court direction which goes on outside the parameters of
the People demanding such and such changes be made in a simple causation model.
It is also not clear as to how controversial subjects can easily be reflected in legal
doctrine that are not clearly resolved one way or another in the greater public arena. For
example, not only has the Supreme Court thwarted the march of “We the People”
towards democratization, but even if it served to move in that direction, as was the case
with the civil rights cases such as Brown v. Board of Education,61 such movement proved
fruitless because the Supreme Court could not democratize practices that were embedded
in particular histories. According to Ackerman, cases like Brown, Griswold v.
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Connecticut,62and Roe v. Wade63 are synthesizing cases or consolidating cases rather than
markers for major shifts in constitutional law. So how is it possible for the Court to
divine the law in controversial cases? Why would the Court bother to decide such
conflicts without clear direction from the democratic principles as laid out by the major
political parties?
However, whether these cases should be seen as synthesizing cases or major markers
of American constitutional law is controversial, because each resulted from a prolonged
effort by civil rights movements, women’s movements, and feminist advocacy groups
that challenged the original Constitution in ways that would have never occurred to the
original drafters.
Certainly blacks and women were excluded from participating in or allowed to sit at
the original drafting of the Constitution. It required many decades of struggle for these
groups to gain constitutional recognition and to further consolidate those gains. But for
Ackerman, the Civil Rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s and the feminist
movement in the 1960s and 1970s, or an earlier generation of women’s movements
seeking the vote, are considered by Ackerman as the privileged beneficiaries of the
Reconstruction and New Deal constitutional alignments. This seems to be reading
history backwards—but skipping over the struggles of African-Americans or women’s
movement for equality.
Ackerman’s hope that the legal community will recognize his one-Constitution/threeregime theory remains elusive, despite his critique of those legal scholars whom he refers
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to as sticklers for original text. He seems to be of the opinion that simply because formal
changes are made to the constitutional document or a switch in time either via the
President after the Civil War or the Justices during the Great Depression, leads to
changes in fact. But, formal changes are made to documents does not mean that changes
in circumstance follow.
Ackerman seems to have the optimistic view that changes in legal structure do,
indeed, indicate the coming forth of new regimes, a sort of predetermined or manifest
destiny to the further democratization of the original Constitution. “Yet I find
Ackerman’s account over-determined. It overemphasizes the role of the Court in
bringing about social change that Ackerman considers positive.”64
Cases following a Civil War and the Great Depression do not suggest the deep and
foundational changes that Ackerman proclaims. He seems to feel that lawyers and
judicial folk are slow to recognize the major changes to the Constitution as a consequence
of the Civil War and the Great Depression. The Supreme Court decisions during and
after these major upheavals in American society did not result in furtherance of the
democratization of the original Constitution. And, at best, Court opinion after these
major social shakeups is mixed.
Further, Ackerman believes that We the People, as citizens, are empowered to go
beyond the formalist criteria in making drastic changes to earlier legal documents when
we are called into action during times of trouble or stress by the politicians. He charges
those sticklers that closely adhere to the original specifications of the Constitution of
being hypertextualists. “This is Ackerman’s belief that ‘hypertextualism’ and allied
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approaches are incompatible with the empirical facts of a living and changing
constitutional order.”65
He believes that in practical affairs, people are empowered to go beyond Article Five
in making changes to the Constitution. He claims this is already what happened with the
Civil War Amendments and with the New Deal. Deep fundamental changes were made
to the original document by going outside its four corners. In both of these instances,
extra-legal means were used to effectuate the change. The same could be said about the
Articles of Confederation—when it came to making changes, the Founders proceeded by
extra-legal means to bring forth the new Constitution.
Ackerman justifies each of these innovative and creative techniques in amending the
Constitution on the ground that ultimately the People were brought into the process, and
they legitimized the outcomes of the Constitution, the Reconstruction Amendments, and
the New Deal. In other words, even if changing the Constitution or drafting a new
Constitution exceeded the formal procedures for making changes to these documents, it
was, nevertheless, justified because the People were called upon to endorse and
legitimize the end product. Thus, the process may have been illegal, but the end product
was ultimately sanctioned by those that ultimately count, We the People.
So, first, Ackerman makes a mistake with regard to his historiography of American
constitutional law; that is, Ackerman seems to adopt a sort of Hegelian dialectical
interpretation of history, as a sort of inevitable movement toward greater
democratization. “Ackerman is motivated to focus on transformative moments precisely
because he fears the implications of simply accepting the idea that constitutional
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principles are historically contingent.”66 And, second, Ackerman appropriates and
misuses a key concept in his analysis of American constitutionalism. He appropriates the
ideas of “democracy” in his characterization of the American system of government.
This distortion is in need of a remedy. Ackerman first targets those legal scholars who
see the Civil War Amendments as a mere continuation of the original Constitution, such
as Justice Black, who would be labeled a hypertexualist by him. Second, Ackerman
targets the Wilsonians, as adherents of monistic government, with violating the
separation of powers. Ackerman adopts Madison’s position via The Federalist 67 to
contest the collapsing of political authority in the way suggested by President Wilson.68
Ackerman seems to want to modernize Madison into a supporter of his dualist
democracy. Yet under no circumstances could Madison support the People participating
in politics. According to Madison, the People should be able to participate in politics at
the most minimal level and very few members of the populace actually qualified to
participate in the political arena. Slaves, women, indigent men, natives, etc. were not
qualified to participate in a Madisonian democracy. Only the elite and those with
property qualified to participate in the political arena.69
The Founders inherent fear of centralized authority or the amassing of majority power
in the hands of ordinary citizens translated into a Federalist republic, with checks and
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balances, and the separation of powers. Also, the Founders had to deal with the practical
task of uniting the States beyond the loose links established by the Articles of
Confederation. The citizens of the thirteen separate and independent states saw
themselves as citizens of their respective states rather than as Americans.
The fear of concentrated power has dissipated since the Founders drafted the
Constitution, not because of changes in human nature during the 200-year span, but
because of technological and industrial advances. The private sector has advanced to the
point that public space is only of secondary importance in the ordering of people’s
lives.70 Government simply serves as a traffic officer and umpire in a world dominated
by private business and industry. Private industry and corporations have rewritten the old
fashioned territorial boundaries that were monitored via nation-states. The protection of
the physical borders is less of a priority than the protection of intellectual property.
Consequently, the agrarian society, in which the original Federalist Constitution was
developed, has passed from the scene.
At bottom, Ackerman’s thesis is that citizen participation is not dead. That is,
although he recognizes the empirical evidence with respect to the decline of citizen
participation, he, nevertheless, goes on to explain this decline in the following way: Even
though citizen participation is needed for the government to be labeled a “democracy,”
this does not mean that citizens must participate in everyday politics. Citizens may
delegate this responsibility to the professional politicians. So, even though day-to-day
citizen participation is low in American politics, it does not negate the label that
Americans choose to describe their government. Although it is not a direct democracy, it
can faithfully and accurately be labeled a “representative democracy” because citizens
70

GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (VINTAGE BOOKS 1966).

37

are the ultimate sovereign. Is Ackerman attempting to explain dualist democracy a way
of justifying and salvaging the label of “democracy” even though he is fully aware that
citizens have little interest or inclination in participating in the political arena?
In short, Ackerman’s thesis is that although citizen participation in politics has
declined, we can still characterize the American government as a “democracy” because
citizens play a key role during those critical moments in American constitutional
history—where their turnout is crucial to legitimizing a particular course of action or
policy. That is, citizens are busy people; they have lives to live; they hardly have the
time to constantly engage in day-to-day politics. What is puzzling and needs to be
fleshed out is that Ackerman seems to perfectly understand the lack of citizen
participation, citizen interest, and sufficient citizen information to elect representatives to
speak for him or her. Yet Ackerman still depends and relies on citizen participation as
the key to transformative government. How does the lack of citizen participation in
politics affect Ackerman’s thesis of dualist constitutionalism to speak for We the People?
As indicated above, Ackerman is well aware of the problem of citizen participation.
He seems to recognize, correctly, that deterioration of citizenship participation poses
serious problems in establishing and maintaining “democratic” institutions. However, I
have argued that despite Ackerman’s correct evaluation of data, suggesting the neglect
and relative ignorance of citizens regarding the political world, Ackerman has not
completely understood or come to terms with the fundamental problems involving
democratic principles. If all citizens know about politics is paying taxes and compulsory
jury service, the assumption that they care about government outside their pocket book or
with issues that do not tangentially affect them seems reasonable.
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Why should government press more for their attention than private industry or nonprofit corporation? Citizens that are looking for safety, putting food on the table, and
pursuing their goals, unhindered by either the public sector or the private sector, have no
need to privilege one over the other. Pluralists recognized this as far back as the 1950s—
that the government can be seen as just one more interest group competing with many
other interest groups for citizen attention and dollars. If a corporation is best able to
provide these goods to the citizenry, and the public sector is simply perceived as taxing
them, then why would citizens be more loyal to the government over a corporation that
clothes, feeds, and protects their financial security? Of course, this is only a rough
analysis of day-to-day living. It excludes a consideration of the government’s overall
contribution to the private sector by making it possible for corporations to operate in the
first place.
It appears that Ackerman is well aware of his critic’s charges with regard to his
excessive reliance on American exceptionalism, the growth of democracy, and
patriotism. Ackerman is aware of those that claim his optimistic march of democracy is
blinded only by his patriotism. Ackerman replies thus: “There are Whigs and there are
Whigs. My own version—such as it is—absolutely renounces any notion of linear
constitutional development, and especially the whiggish conceit that this linear
development has reached for all of us to greet Y2K as the final triumph of the American
struggle for freedom, equality, and justice.”71
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V. Conclusion

In summary, I argued that Ackerman makes a very serious mistake in grounding his
dualist constitutionalism on popular sovereignty. The notion of popular sovereignty is
controversial. It especially poses serious problems for the Rights Foundationalists.
Those that privilege individual rights to democratic principles are dismayed over
Ackerman’s dualist democratic thesis, which states that basic rights that are either listed
in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere can be overturned, removed, or amended in accordance
with the People’s will.
Basically, the People rule in an Ackermanian democracy. Ackerman does not see
anything in the Constitution or official documents that could not be overturned by
following his constitutional moments procedures. For example, should a sufficient
amount of people wish to add an amendment to the Constitution declaring Christianity
the official religion, then so be it.72 Democracy trumps rights in the Ackermanian
universe. The People have spoken. Many rights foundationalists are dismayed at the
ease by which majority rule can trump fundamental rights under Ackerman’s reading of
the Constitution.
His one Constitution/three regime model of American constitutional history is in need
of close examination. What he regards as the three constitutional moments has been
found to be either over-inclusive or under-inclusive by his critics. Legal historians and
72

“For the Galstons especially, the Constitution is built upon a foundation of inalienable rights—whose
content is to be elaborated through appropriate philosophical speculation. Only after this foundation has
been secured does the Constitution give leeway to democratic judgment on less-than-foundational issues. I
am more skeptical. My understanding of the Constitution does not begin with inalienable rights; it starts
with the effort by the American people to govern themselves. Fundamental rights have constitutional status
only if they have their source in a deliberate and mobilized affirmation of principle by the American
people. Our constitution is democratic first, rights-respecting second.” Bruce Ackerman, Rooted
Cosmopolitanism, 104 ETHICS 516, 517 (1994).

40

other historians have found difficulties with Ackerman’s sharp demarcation in the
periodization of American history.73 Historians have debated whether other periods of
American history deserve to be included in what Ackerman considers constitutional
moments. For example, there are historians that believe the Age of Jackson should also
be included. Others believe that the dismantling of Reconstruction also merits inclusion
as a constitutional moment.74
Also, his casting of the Supreme Court in the preservationist role in codifying the
People’s will is seriously mistaken. Regardless of his love of the People, Ackerman
reserved a most critical role for the Supreme Court. He places his faith that that nonelected institution will be able to preserve his dualist democratic principles better than
any other. He seems to be wedded to the proposition that the Supreme Court has done a
reasonable good job (not a perfect job by any means) as the official interpreter and
guardian of the American Constitution. Therefore, he wishes the Court to continue
serving as the People’s preservationist institution. However, scholars and other
thoughtful people over the generations would not be as optimistic or enthusiastic as
Ackerman in casting the Supreme Court as the guardian of the People’s will.
I have attempted to illustrate in this brief reply and overview that his faith in the
Supreme Court is not justified. Ackerman uses the mask of a dualist constitutionalism to
evade the central problem of American constitutionalism: that popular sovereignty plays
no role, or only a small role, in constitutional politics. But, in order to mask the small
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interest in citizen participation in public affairs, Ackerman establishes an elaborate
dualist constitutional model to hide the non-democratic nature of American government.
That is, in order to explain this lack of citizen participation in matters political, Ackerman
develops an elaborate scheme of dualist democracy as a cover for political legitimacy.
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